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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Larry Eugene Morris appeals from the district court's summary dismissal
of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Morris pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a
plea agreement. State v. Morris, Unpublished Opinion No. 312, p. 1 (Ct. App.
2013). The district court sentenced Morris to unified ten-year sentence with the
first five years fixed.

l!t.

Morris filed a Rule 35 motion asking the court to

suspend his sentence and place him on probation.

l!t.

The district court did not

suspend Morris' sentence, but did reduce his sentence to four years fixed
followed by six years indeterminate.

l!t. at

1-2. Morris appealed, and the Idaho

Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and
sentence.

l!t. at 5.

Morris then filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 4-17.)
In it he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations as
they related to the sufficiency of the evidence, an alleged violation of the
settlement offer by the state, and a claim of the involuntariness of his plea of
guilty. (Id.) The state moved for summary dismissal of Morris' petition asserting
Morris had failed to set forth sufficient evidence to support his petition as well as
his failure to meet the 2-prongs of the Strickland test.

(R., pp.44-52.) Morris,

through counsel, filed a response to the state's motion for summary dismissal
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asserting Morris had set forth sufficient evidence to support his claims as well as
fulfilling the requirements of Strickland. (R. pp.81-93.)
Following a hearing on the state's motion, the district court issued a
written order granting summary dismissal of Morris' petition for post-conviction
relief. (R., pp.105-131.) Morris timely appealed. 1 (R., pp.134-137.)

Although counsel was originally appointed to represent Morris on this appeal
(R., pp.144-145), the SAPD subsequently filed a motion for leave to withdraw
from its representation of Morris based on the inability of three attorneys to
identify "any meritorious issues for review" (4/2/13 Affidavit in Support of Motion
for Leave to Withdraw and Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule). The
motion to withdraw as counsel was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court, causing
the SAPD to retain representation of Morris on appeal. (5/7/2013 Order).
1

2

ISSUES
Morris states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Morris'
petition for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Morris failed to show the district court erred in dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief where he failed to establish any prejudice as a result of
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?
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ARGUMENT
Morris Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Where He Failed To Establish Any Prejudice
As A Result Of His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
Morris contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.) Morris addresses
only one claim originally asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief on
appeal: that the district court erred in determining there was "no genuine issue
of material fact as to [his] assertion that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
deficient performance" (Appellant's brief, p.9) for failing to "get the judge in the
CPA case to unseal the documents in the CPA case for the purpose of Mr.
Morris' sentencing hearing in the criminal case" (Appellant's brief, p.12).
Because the district court correctly concluded Morris had failed to
establish the prejudice prong of Strickland, Morris' argument fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal from summary
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
4

review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more
than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). The
petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce
admissible evidence to support his allegations. kl_ (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in
the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v.
State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
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583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition.

kl

(citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220

(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

D.

kl

Morris Fails To Make A Valid Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim
Morris has failed to establish the district court erred in summarily

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition for post-conviction
relief, Morris asserted three claims. On appeal, Morris does not challenge the
entirety of the district court's summary dismissal of his petition. Instead, he only
addresses summary dismissal of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failing to persuade the sentencing court to unseal CPA documents to
review for Morris' sentencing hearing.

(Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.)
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Morris

contends the district court erred in dismissing his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because it failed to "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr.
Morris" when concluding Morris had not established any prejudice resulting from
Morris' trial counsel's failure to have the trial court review said documents prior to
sentencing. (Id.)
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

An attorney's

performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132
Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme
Court has recently reiterated:
Surmounting Strick/ands high bar is never an easy task. An
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care,
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.
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Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
Morris claims on appeal that had the sentencing court had the documents
from his ongoing child protection case in front of it for review at his sentencing,
the court would have realized how difficult it was for Morris to comply with the
terms of his plea agreement to cooperate in drug buys for law enforcement
without violating both the terms of said agreement and the requirements of his
case plan to maintain custody rights of his daughter. (Appellant's brief, pp.1314.)

Morris claims he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to ensure

these documents were made part of the sentencing court's record "because the
sentencing court never fully understood the true nature of the conflict between
the court orders in the CPA case and the obligations continued [sic] in terms of
cooperation."

(Appellant's brief, p.15.)

Morris asserts that the district court

"would not have done the same thing as the sentencing court," and as such,
"there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the question of whether Mr. Morris
was prejudiced" by his trial court's failure to utilize the CPA records at his
sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p.16.)
Morris asserts the district court "found that trial counsel was deficient for
his failure to get the judge in the CPA case to unseal the documents in the CPA
case for the purpose of Mr. Morris' sentencing hearing in the criminal case."
(Appellant's brief, p.12 (citation to the record omitted).) What the district court
found was that Morris had "alleged a genuine issue of fact as to whether his
counsel's performance in failing to present convincing argument for the court to
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take judicial notice of the C.P.A. case document constituted defective
performance." (R., p.122.) However, in granting the state's motion for summary
dismissal of Morris' petition for post-conviction relief, the court found "Morris
ha[d] not alleged a genuine issue of fact that, if resolved in his favor, shows that
he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to present convincing
argument to the court for it to consider the C.P.A. case documents." (R., p.124.)
The record supports this conclusion.
As the district court found, the child protection case involving Morris'
daughter did not exist at the time Morris entered into the plea agreement with the
state. (R., p.121.) In fact, Morris' girlfriend was pregnant with the child at issue
when she contacted law enforcement on Morris' behalf to offer his assistance as
a confidential informant.

(Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials (5/31 /13

augmentation).) Morris entered a guilty plea and was released from jail (see,
generally, 7/23/10 Tr.) on the same day he met with law enforcement and
entered into a "Terms of Cooperation" with the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task
Force to act as a confidential informant, accepting $500 from law enforcement
for his "necessary living expenses" (Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials
(5/31/13 augmentation)). The terms of Morris' plea, as placed on the record,
were that the parties agreed to a five-year fixed sentenced followed by five years
indeterminate, with the state's recommendation of whether said sentence should
be imposed or suspended to be determined between the time of the entry of the
plea and the sentencing itself, presumably to allow the state to obtain information
from law enforcement regarding Morris' level of cooperation. (7/23/10 Tr., p.5,
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L.20 - p.6, L.3.) The child at issue in the child protection case was born
(Adjudicatory Report of the Guardian ad Litem (5/17 /13 augmentation).)
Morris failed to maintain contact with law enforcement and in September,
expressed his desire to "take [his] chances and just go to sentencing."
(Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials (5/31/13 augmentation).)

The case

plan involving Morris was filed with the court on November, 5, 2010, but had a
start date for the affected parties of October 22, 2010. (Order Regarding Case
Plan (5/17/13 Augmentation).) Because of his failure to maintain contact with
the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, Morris' service as a confidential
informant was concluded on November 10, 2010.
Sentencing Materials (5/31/13 augmentation).)

(Additional Plaintiff's

Morris was sentenced on

November 29, 2010, at which time the state noted Morris had failed to comply
the conditions of his performance as a confidential informant, thus releasing the
state from the terms of the plea agreement which would have required a
probation recommendation by the state. (11/29/10 Tr., p.10, L.1 - p.11, L.1.)
At Morris' sentencing hearing, a case worker from the child protection
case testified that Morris had made progress in a short period of time by being
involved in extensive outpatient therapy, submitting clean urinalysis results, and
"making incredible strides" to do for his family and comply with the case plan.
(11/29/10 Tr., p.22, L.6 - p.23, L.21.) As the district court found in granting the
state's motion to summarily dismiss Morris' petition for post-conviction relief, "the
court was able to consider Morris's performance in the C.P.A. case, and could
infer that Morris's desire to meet every condition of that program had hindered
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his ability to cooperate with the task force."

(R., p.124.)

Morris asserts on

appeal that without the actual child protection case plan before the sentencing
court, the "true nature" of the conflict Morris was faced with could not be fully
understood and thus prejudiced Morris.

(Appellant's brief, p.15.) The district

court erred, Morris claims, in inferring the sentencing court was able to determine
"the full extent [of] the CPA case" on Morris' decision not to "adhere to the terms
of cooperation" to be a confidential information pursuant to the agreement he
had entered into with the state.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) Contrary to this

position on appeal, Morris himself testified at sentencing as to just what the
impact of the child protection case was on his decision not to live up to his
agreement with the state when he advised the sentencing court he did not "follow
the state asked to do with regarding stuff," because he did not want to work as a
confidential informant because it "interfere[ed] with [his] family" and jeopardized
his progress pursuant to the open child protection case. (11/29/10 Tr., p.28, L.8
- p.29, L.5.)
Morris later appeared before the sentencing court seeking leniency
pursuant to Rule 35, armed with information of assistance he had provided to
law enforcement on his own initiative after failing to comply with his confidential
informant contract. (2/8/11 Tr., p.12, L.19 - p.16, L.11.) The sentencing court at
that time made it clear probation was never an option for Morris based on his
record and the facts of the underlying case:
I firmly believe that the sentence would have been a prison
sentence. Mr. Morris's record, the facts leading up to the - Mr.
Morris's possession of meth charge and conviction and the fact that
he's a habitual offender means that probation was simply not in the
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cards for Mr. Morris; it's not in the cards today. It would be
diminishing his criminal history. It would be diminishing the crime.
It would not act as appropriate punishment at all. It would not act
as appropriate deterrence to Mr. Morris or to any other person.
(2/8/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.11-20.)

As the district court found in dismissing Morris'

petition for post-conviction relief, "Morris would not have received a lesser
sentence even if the court had considered the C.P.A. documents." (R., p.125.)
As such, Morris had failed to "allege a genuine issue of fact as to whether he
was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to present convincing argument to the
court regarding consideration of the C.P.A. case documents." (Id.) The record
supports this and thus supports the district court's summary dismissal of Morris'
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's
denial of Morris' petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of August, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

N
Deputy Attorney Gen r

NLS/pm

13

